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Abstract
Detection failures in perceptual tasks can result from different causes: sometimes we may fail to see something because
perceptual information is noisy or degraded, and sometimes we may fail to see something due to the limited capacity of attention.
Previous work indicates that metacognitive capacities for detection failures may differ depending on the specific stimulus
visibility manipulation employed. In this investigation, wemeasuredmetacognition while matching performance in two visibility
manipulations: phase-scrambling and the attentional blink. As in previous work, metacognitive asymmetries emerged: despite
matched type 1 performance, metacognitive ability (measured by area under the ROC curve) for reporting stimulus absence was
higher in the attentional blink condition, which was mainly driven by metacognitive ability in correct rejection trials. We
performed Signal Detection Theoretic (SDT) modeling of the results, showing that differences in metacognition under equal
type I performance can be explained when the variance of the signal and noise distributions are unequal. Specifically, the present
study suggests that phase scrambling signal trials have a wider distribution (more variability) than attentional blink signal trials,
leading to a larger area under the ROC curve for attentional blink trials where subjects reported stimulus absence. These results
provide a theoretical basis for the origin of metacognitive differences on trials where subjects report stimulus absence, and may
also explain previous findings where the absence of evidence during detection tasks results in lower metacognitive performance
when compared to categorization.
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Introduction
Our daily lives require that we be able to detect the presence or
absence of objects in the environment. For example, when
driving a car, we may primarily be concerned with detecting
objects that might interfere with the path of our vehicle.
Potentially, there may be different reasons why we fail to
detect something: sometimes we may not detect an object
because our perception is degraded (due to fog, low light, or
other factors), and other times wemay not detect an object due
to lapses in our attention. These two scenarios involving de-
tection failures raise interesting questions: is our subjective
sense of visual confidence in what we see in these scenarios
roughly equivalent, or does it differ? And if it does differ, why
might this be the case?
Kanai, Walsh, and Tseng (2010) denoted these two phe-
nomena perceptual blindness and attentional blindness: per-
ceptual blindness is a failure of perception caused by weak
sensory signals that are difficult to distinguish from no signal
at all, and attentional blindness is a failure of perception due to
an inability to access sensory signals despite their presence.
To probe whether the sense of confidence differs between
these phenomena, Kanai et al. had observers perform six differ-
ent detection tasks that manipulated stimulus visibility in differ-
ent ways (contrast reduction, backward masking, flash suppres-
sion, dual task, attentional blink, and spatial uncertainty) and
rate confidence in their responses. By analyzing confidence
judgments, they demonstrated that target misses were not dis-
tinguishable from actual target absence for contrast reduction,
backwardmasking, and flash suppression, butwere distinguish-
able in the dual task, attentional blink, and spatial uncertainty
paradigms. These results support the idea that metacognitive
judgments may not index all detection failures equally, but
much is still unknown about the relationship between metacog-
nition and these visibility manipulations.
In the present study, we aimed to investigate perceptual
metacognition in a detection task which manipulated stimulus
visibility in two ways: (1) phase scrambling (PS), and (2) the
attentional blink (AB). Phase scrambling is a manipulation
whereby visual stimuli are scrambled to become unrecogniz-
able, but the spatial frequency content of the image remains
similar (Oppenheim, & Lim 1981; Thomson, 1999). The at-
tentional blink is a phenomenon where a second target often
goes unseen when it is presented between approximately 180
to 450 ms after the presentation of a first target in a rapid serial
visual presentation (RSVP) (Raymond, Shapiro, & Arnell,
1992). Our rationale for using these conditions is built upon
several neural and behavioral findings which indicate that
PS and the AB likely result in different phenomenal ex-
periences and different metacognitive assessments across
the two conditions (Moratti et al., 2014; Dell'Acqua, Dux,
Wyble, Doro, Sessa, Meconi, and Jolicœur, 2015;
Kranczioch et al., 2005).
First, evidence indicates these manipulations rely on differ-
ent neural systems. The capacity to consciously perceive a
challenging PS picture appears to rest primarily upon process-
ing in occipital circuitry (Moratti et al., 2014), whereas some
“blinked” targets in AB paradigms cannot be seen because of
disruptions within the frontal-parietal brain network
(Dell’Acqua et al., 2015; Kranczioch et al., 2005). Second,
behavioral results indicate that metacognitive differences
emerge across task types (e.g., detection and discrimination)
when employing visibility manipulations such as phase scram-
bling (Meuwese et al., 2014). In this study, metacognitive
ability was assessed by plotting the receiver-operating charac-
teristic (ROC) curves and computing the area under the curve
(AUC) independently for each task-stimulus combination. It
was shown that differences in metacognitive abilities emerged
on “correct rejection” trials (i.e., trials where the subject cor-
rectly assesses that a target stimulus was not present) across
different task conditions.
The results ofMeuwese et al. (2014) may be explained by a
violation of the assumption of equal variance in Signal
Detection Theory (SDT). Specifically, in SDT it is assumed
that on any given trial the subject’s nervous system represents
the presence of either the nontarget (e.g., noise) stimulus or
target stimulus as a random sample from a noisy representa-
tion of the information, and compares this sample to an inter-
nal criterion to make a perceptual judgment about stimulus
presence or absence. Themost common analysis in this frame-
work assumes that the variances of the distributions
representing the nontarget and target stimuli are equal (which
is an assumption that is sometimes impossible to evaluate, as
studies which do not record confidence reports do not have
multiple points on the zROC function to assess variance
asymmetry). When the variances are equal, standard measures
of performance such as the area under the ROC curve (AUC)
are unbiased. However, if the distributions representing the
nontarget and target stimuli are unequal, as is often the case
in detection tasks (Green & Swets, 1966; Macmillan &
Creelman, 2005), then response-specific AUC measures are
strongly influenced by interactions between the variance of
the signal distribution and the placement of the response cri-
terion, which can greatly influence results.
Critically, we hypothesized that this phenomenon in Signal
Detection Theory (violating the assumption of the equal vari-
ance) may not only underlie the results of Meuwese et al.
(2014), but could potentially explain differences in subjective
experience between PS and AB visibility manipulations. Thus,
we performed an experiment and simulations in which we
aimed to assess the metacognitive ability of participants using
a detection task with two conditions (phase scrambling and the
attentional blink) to manipulate awareness of stimuli. These
two conditions were partly chosen based on the aforemen-
tioned research by Kanai, Walsh, and Tseng (2010). Their
research operationally defined metacognitive ability by
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computing a response-specific AUC for correct rejection and
miss trials, and they showed that visibility manipulations cause
differences in metacognitive ability for “No” responses (spe-
cifically, correct rejections: participants had higher levels of
metacognitive ability for correct rejections in attentional blink
trials compared to trials with physical degradation of stimuli),
but similar metacognitive ability for “Yes” responses. These
differences could be reflected by changes in specific mecha-
nisms in SDT frameworks: the judgment that “there was noth-
ing” for the AB seems phenomenally quite distinct from the
judgment that “there was something I couldn’t recognize for
sure” in PS, and identifying where this change emerges in SDT
could provide novel insights about the relationship between
SDT, metacognition, and phenomenology.
Therefore, in line with the results of Kanai et al. (2010), we
hypothesized that there would be no differences in
metacognitive ability (assessed by response-conditional
Type 1 AUC values in our study) for the “Yes” response trials,
but that there would be a difference for the “No” response
trials. Specifically, we hypothesized that during AB trials,
participants would be more aware of when they missed a
stimulus and therefore be better at categorizing metacognitive
judgements, which would not happen as often during PS trials.
Finally, we hypothesized that this difference in metacognition
would also be evident in a violation of the equal variance
assumption of SDT in the experimental data. To anticipate,




In this study, 38 students at the University of California-Los
Angeles (age range = 18–29 years,M = 20.29, SD = 1.99; 11
men) participated for partial fulfillment of course require-
ments. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vi-
sion, no history of neurological conditions, and gave written
informed consent before participation. The experiment was
approved by the UCLA Institutional Review Board. For the
analyses, three participants (subject #3, #8, and #18) were
excluded because they did not use the entire confidence rating
scale as was instructed (e.g., if subjects use only one confi-
dence rating for all trials, we cannot assess how confidence
differs across our two conditions). In total, 35 students were
included in the final analyses (age range: 18–29 years, M =
20.31, SD = 2.05; nine men).
Stimuli
The stimuli used in this experiment were fromMeuwese et al.
(2014), which included 600 grayscale animal photos from
three categories: birds (200), cats (200) and fish (200).
These stimulus categories were matched for low-level image
statistics. For each image containing an animal, we created a
non-animal-counterpart by fully randomizing the phase infor-
mation in the image, effectively removing all object informa-
tion (coherence) from the image (e.g., compare the leftmost
and rightmost image in Fig. 1 to see the difference between an
animal and its non-animal counterpart).
Phase-scrambling was also used to parametrically manipu-
late visibility in the PS task. The phase scrambled versions of
these stimuli had similar low-level image statistics (e.g., over-
all contrast), but object information was gradually removed
with increased levels of phase scrambling (see Fig. 1, left to
right).
In both tasks, all distractor stimuli were gray and all target
stimuli had a blue filter over the photo. Stimuli contained
either animals or noise (i.e., a 100% phase scrambled photo)
and were shown for 50 ms (see Fig. 2). The blanks in between
stimuli lasted for 100 ms.
Procedure
When participants came to the lab, they first filled out an
eligibility checklist to confirm that they were 18 years or
older, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, did not have
a neurological condition (e.g., epilepsy) and could fully com-
prehend the English language. After giving informed consent,
they received specific instructions for the task. The task
consisted of a rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) para-
digm and included two trial types: a short lag trial with 250 ms
between target 1 and 2 (attentional blink, or “AB”), and a long
lag trial with 850 ms between target 1 and 2 (phase scrambled,
or “PS”). Thus, the design of this experiment has one inde-
pendent variable (visibility) with two levels (AB vs. PS), but
we note that the timing of the stimuli also differs across these
two condition types by necessity.
Each trial started with a fixation dot for 500 ms, after which
the RSVP started (Fig. 3). First, three to five gray distractors
were presented (the number of three to five was pseudo-
randomly selected every trial). Then, the first target (T1) was
shown in blue. In both conditions, T1 was either fully intact if
it contained an animal (non-scrambled) or 100% phase-
scrambled if it did not contain an animal (i.e., if it was noise).
Therefore, T1 did not differ between trial types. Next, a vari-
able number of gray distractors were shown. After these
distractors, the second blue target (T2) appeared. For AB trials
there was only one gray distractor between T1 and T2, while
for PS trials there were five gray distractors between T1 and
T2. For AB trials, T2 was either a blue non-PS picture
(animal) or a blue, 100% phase-scrambled picture (no animal).
For PS trials, the second target was either a blue partially PS
picture (animal), or blue 100% scrambled picture (no animal).
After the second target, five to seven gray distractors (pseudo-
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randomly assigned using the np.random.choice function from
the SciPy library (Jones, Oliphant, & Peterson, 2001)) ap-
peared. Finally, the questions for the targets appeared.
Participants initially had to decide whether the first target
(T1) was an animal or not and press the corresponding key.
Then participants had to indicate whether the second target
(T2) contained an animal or not, while simultaneously indi-
cating their confidence about that decision with four levels of
certainty (8-point scale: 8 entirely certain not an animal, 7
most likely not an animal, 6 probably not an animal, 5 unsure
not an animal, 4 unsure an animal, 3 probably an animal, 2
most likely an animal, 1 entirely certain an animal). This re-
sponse method combines the classical “Type 1” judgment
(assessing whether or not the target contained an animal) with
a “Type 2” judgment (evaluating the confidence one has in the
judgment of whether the target contained an animal).
Participants were explicitly instructed that the first response
should only reflect their decision about the first target (T1) and
that the second response should only reflect their decision
about the second target (T2) that appeared in each sequence.
Participants began the experimental task by completing
practice blocks designed to yield equal performance for
the AB and PS trial types. The first block consisted of 54
trials, including 36 AB trials and 18 PS trials, to identify
an average percentage correct for the AB trials (PS trials
were included so participants would not learn to expect
the exact time the stimulus would appear, but were ex-
cluded from further analysis). If the performance on the
AB trials was not high enough (i.e., was lower than 65%
correct), the participant had to redo this block until their
performance was higher than 65%. The second block (108
trials; 72 PS trials and 36 AB trials) used a staircasing
procedure (QUEST) (Watson & Pelli, 1983) to find a
degree of PS such that the percentage correct between
the AB and PS trial types was approximately equivalent.
During the main experiment, participants completed eight
blocks of 72 trials, for a total of 576 trials. Within each block,
AB and PS trials were randomly interleaved, and there was an
equal number of each trial type. To ensure performance was
matched in all blocks for T2 responses for the AB and PS
trials, whenever the percentage correct on PS trials became
more than five percentage points higher than the percentage
correct on AB trials, the PS level was raised by 1/19 (yielding
20 possible PS levels as 0%was also included). If the percent-
age correct on long lag trials got worse than ten percentage
points below the short lag, the PS level was lowered by 1/19.
Fig. 2 Examples of the targets and distractors for the attentional blink
(AB) and phase scrambled (PS) stimuli. All blue stimuli are targets and all
grayscale stimuli are distractors. AB stimuli are shown in the top row, and
include examples of the first target (Target 1), examples of the second
target (Target 2), and distractor stimuli. PS stimuli are shown in the
second row, and include examples of the first target, examples of the
second target (57.89% PS), and distractor stimuli
Fig. 1 Examples of phase scrambling levels. This figure shows the spectrum of the amounts of phase scrambling used in the experimental task, from 0–
100%. The rightmost image is the image that was used as the non-animal counterpart in all experimental tasks
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Results
To evaluate whether the objective (type 1) difficulty between
trial types was successfully matched, we performed a paired-
samples t-test in the following manner: first, we selected the
subset of trials which included a correct T1 response. (This is
because in AB trials, it is easier to have the T2 response cor-
rect if T1 was unattended or ignored; thus, we aimed for con-
sistency across trial types.) Then, we selected the type 1 (an-
imal/no animal) judgments from T2 responses and performed
a paired-samples t-test on the percentage correct between AB
and PS trials. Results showed that performance for T2 (when
T1 was correct) was similar for the two trial types (AB trials:
70.00% correct [range = 54.39–81.07, SD = 6.1], PS trials:
69.28% correct [range = 57.75–79.21, SD = 5.3], t(34) = 1.40,
p = .17). For full transparency, we note that participants had
on average 2% more T1 correct on PS trials compared to AB
trials (PS: 91.84% correct, SD = 8.0%; AB: 89.69% correct,
SD = 9.3%; t(34) = -3.67, p < .001).
To visualize the behavioral responses, we first plotted
pseudo Type 1-ROC curves, which were formed by using
each confidence rating as a decision criterion for performing
the detection task and plotting the corresponding false alarm
and hit percentages for each of these points (Fig. 4a). A
Wilcoxon signed-rank test of the AUC values (computed
using MATLAB’s “perfcurve” function) between trial types
revealed that the values were not significantly different from
one another (z = -1.16, p = .24, Fig. 4b), although the shapes
of the curves were quite distinct. Overall, this provided further
support for matched type 1 performance between the PS and
AB trial types.
Next, we analyzed whether there was a general difference
for metacognitive ability between trial types using the same
methods as (Meuwese et al., 2014); namely, ROC curves from
conditional responses (correct/incorrect trials, yes responses,
and no responses). Figure 5a shows the ability of confidence
ratings to distinguish between correct and incorrect responses,
using the data from all subjects. There was a significant dif-
ference for average confidence ratings to better distinguish
correct and incorrect trials in AB trials than in PS trials, as
shown by a Wilcoxon signed-rank test of the area under the
curve (AUC) values (z = -2.09, p =.036). To explore the dif-
ference between trial types in more detail, type 2 ROC curves
were made for the “Yes, animal present” responses (false
alarm and hit trials). These curves (Fig. 5c and d) showed that
performance on these trials was quite similar between the PS
and AB conditions (z = 1.15, p = .25). However, the type 2
ROC curves of the “No, animal not present” responses (misses
and correct rejections (CR)) (see Fig. 5e and f) did indicate a
difference in AUC values between the AB and PS trial types
(z = -2.00, p = .046). Thus, subjects were better at using
metacognitive judgments in AB trials to distinguish between
correct and incorrect trials for “No” responses compared to
when they were using metacognitive judgments in PS trials.
Interestingly, the higher metacognitive performance in AB
trials compared to PS trials was slightly modulated bywhether
or not an animal was present in T1. For the AB Trials, an
analysis of all responses to T2 (both yes and no), indicated
there was a difference that was almost significant between T1
present and T1 absent trials (t(34) = 1.97, p = .06). Breaking
this down further, we analyzed differences in metacognitive
ability for the T2 yes and T2 no responses separately.
Participants had better metacognitive ability for T2 yes re-
sponses when T1 did contain an animal (t(34) = -2.18, p =
.04). Conversely, participants had slightly worse
metacognitive ability for T2 no responses when T1 did not
contain an animal (t(34) = 2.21, p = .03). This indicates that
metacognition for the AB may differ slightly based on wheth-
er first image is a target or not. Similar findings did not emerge
for the PS trials: measured through type 2 AUC values, par-
ticipants’ metacognitive ability did not differ between T1 an-
imal present and absent trials, when all responses on T2 were
taken into account (t(34) = -0.07, p = .94), when only yes
answers (“there is an animal in T2”) were analyzed (t(34) =
Fig. 3 Representative trials for the attentional blink (AB) and phase
scrambled (PS) trial types. In both conditions, following 500 ms of fixa-
tion, three to five distractors were shown, followed by the first target,
which was either noise or a clear picture of an animal. After the first
target, in the AB condition, one distractor was shown, immediately
followed by the second target. In the PS condition, five distractors were
shown before the second target was presented. The trial concluded with
five to seven additional distractors being shown, followed by the question
prompts asking whether the first target (T1) was an animal, and confi-
dence regarding whether the second target (T2) contained an animal. All
stimuli were shown for 50 ms and all blank screens for 100 ms. The
response screens were shown until a key was pressed
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1.08, p =.29) and also when only no answers were analyzed
(“there is no animal in T2”) (t(34) = 0.57, p = .57).
We then sorted our data to determine if differences in con-
fidence between the AB and PS conditions were driven by a
specific Type 1 stimulus-response combination. Figure 6 dis-
plays ROC curves for each Type 1 response, including (A)
hits, (B) misses, (C) false alarms, and (D) correct rejections.
As can be seen in the results, a clear pattern emerges: “yes,
target present” responses (left column) lead to a stronger con-
fidence profile in AB compared to PS, whereas “no, target
absent” responses (right column) lead to under-confidence in
the AB compared to PS, regardless of whether they were cor-
rect in their judgement of target presence or absence.
Interestingly, our results conceptually replicate several
findings by Meuwese et al. (2014). In their study, they report-
ed significant differences between the target detection tasks
participants performed (i.e., categorization and detection).
They showed that metacognitive ability was higher for cate-
gorization compared to detection (based on AUC values plot-
ting correct vs. incorrect responses) across all trials, and that
this difference was primarily driven by differences in “No”
response trials (their Fig. 2). Additionally, they did not show
a significant difference in metacognitive ability between tasks
based solely on the “Yes” response trials. The authors con-
cluded that metacognitive ability is better in tasks that rely on
positive evidence (categorization) than in tasks that rely more
strongly on absence of evidence (detection).
However, the quantitative framework used by Meuwese
and colleagues to analyze their results, Signal Detection
Theory (SDT), provides a possible alternative explanation of
why differences in metacognitive ability may have emerged
across tasks. SDT is typically used to analyze perceptual
decisions that are made in uncertain or ambiguous situations
(Wickens, 2002). In this framework (Fig. 7), whenever a stim-
ulus is presented, it is assumed that an internal response is
generated which encodes the stimulus (e.g., either signal or
noise), and this response represents a sample from a distribu-
tion with some amount of variability. On each trial, the ob-
server compares the strength of the evidence they obtained to
an internal criterion, and makes a judgment as to whether this
stimulation originated from a signal present in the environ-
ment or random noise. For a detection task (e.g., “is ‘A’ pres-
ent or not?”) the decision-making process can be represented
by two curves, one capturing ‘A’ absence (e.g., a noise trial)
and one capturing ‘A’ presence (e.g., a signal trial). This
yields four different possibilities for type 1 performance: hits,
misses, false alarms, and correct rejections.
In many studies employing SDT, it is assumed that the
signal and noise distributions have equal variances. To simu-
late the results from a detection taskwhere the signal and noise
have equal variance, we can sample 10,000 trials from the
noise distribution (mean 0, var 1) and 10,000 trials from the
signal distribution (mean fixed at 2 for this simulation, var 1),
and then sweep the criterion along the x-axis (from -2 to 4,
using 20 different criteria for confidence) to plot full ROC
curves for hits versus false alarms, and correct rejections ver-
sus misses. The results from this simulation are shown in Fig.
8. In the “Yes” response ROC plot (Fig. 8b, left), as in
Meuwese et al. (2014), the leftmost inflection point is the
proportion of Yes/Correct (i.e., hits) responses for which the
highest confidence rating was given versus the percentage of
Yes/Incorrect (i.e., false alarms) responses with the highest
confidence rating. The “No” response ROC plot (Fig. 8b,
right) follows the same convention. With equal variances for
Fig. 4 Pseudo Type-1 receiver-operating characteristic (ROC) curves and
area under the curve (AUC) values for the attentional blink (AB) and
phase scrambled (PS) trials. (a) The ROC curves for each condition.
Each curve plots the average data across all subjects. Each dot on the
graph represents data from a different confidence rating; specifically, each
dot represents a different decision criterion (for a given confidence rating)
and the corresponding percentage of hits and false alarms. The black
dotted line provides a reference for chance-level performance. Error bars
represent SEM across subjects. (b) The average AUC values for the PS
and AUC conditions. These AUC bars plot the averaged AUC values for
individual subjects’ curves, with error bars denoting SEM across subjects
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these two distributions, these type 1 response-conditional
ROC curves have a characteristic shape: that is, ROC curves
which plot the probability of confidence given a hit versus the
probability of confidence given a false alarm, and ROC curves
that plot the probability of confidence given a correct rejection
versus the probability of confidence given a miss, have similar
shapes.
However, the assumption of equal variance between the
signal and noise distributions can be violated. In
circumstances where the variances of these two distributions
differ, distinct patterns emerge for the response-conditional
ROC curves for stimulus absence, which can directly influence
AUCmagnitude (Fig. 9). Critically, violation of this assumption
strongly influences the ROC curves for “signal-absent” trials,
illustrating the importance of evaluating this assumption before
applying SDT analyses to data.
To explicitly evaluate whether the equal variance assump-
tion was violated for the AB and the PS trials in our
Fig. 5 Response-conditional receiver-operating characteristic (ROC)
curves using across-subject averages. (a-b) The probability for each con-
fidence judgment given either a correct or incorrect response. Correct
responses were composed of the summed counts for correct rejections
and hits for each confidence level, and incorrect responses were com-
posed of the summed counts for misses and false alarms across each
confidence level. The ROC curve plots the average results across all
subjects, and the AUC bars plot the averaged AUC values for each indi-
vidual subjects’ curves. Error bars represent the standard error of the
mean across subjects. (c-d) The probability of each confidence judgment
given a Yes response. The y-axis shows this probability for Yes responses
that were correct (hits), and the x-axis shows this probability for the Yes
responses that were incorrect (false alarms, FA). Conventions are the
same as panels A-B. (e-f) The probability of each confidence judgment
given a No response. The y-axis shows this probability for no responses
that were correct (correct rejections), and the x-axis shows this probability
for no responses that were incorrect (misses). Conventions are the same as
panels A-B. *p< .05
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experiment, Type 1 zROC analyses were performed (Fig. 10).
Specifically, the hit and false alarm rates of the type 1 ROC
analysis were z-scored for each participant. A linear line was
then fit to each participant’s data through the points in zROC
space using MATLAB’s “polyfit” function, yielding an esti-
mated slope and intercept for each subject.
If the slopes of these lines in zROC space are near 1, this
supports the idea that the equal variance assumption has been
Fig. 6 Receiver-operating characteristic (ROC) curves for the PS and AB conditions for all Type-1 responses using across-subject averages. Each point
on the graph represents the criterion for a given confidence rating. (a) Hits, (b) Misses, (c) False Alarms (FA), (d) Correct Rejections (CR)
Fig. 7 Signal Detection Theoretical (SDT) framework. In SDT, it is as-
sumed that on each trial of a detection experiment, an observer’s internal
representation can bemodeled as a sample drawn from either a “stimulus-
present” (blue) or “stimulus-absent” (green) distribution. To make a de-
cision about stimulus presence or absence, this sample is then compared
to an internal criterion; if the sample is above the criterion, the participant
responds “signal present,” and if the sample is below the criterion, the
participant responds “signal absent.” This results in four different trial
types: trials where the stimulus was present and the subject correctly
responds that it was presented (hits, light blue); trials where the stimulus
was present and the subject says that it was not (misses, dark blue); trials
where the stimulus was not present and the subject says that it was not
(correct rejections, light green), and trials where the stimulus was not
present, but the subject says that it was (false alarms, dark green)
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met; if the slopes of these lines are different from 1, it is likely
that the equal variance assumption has been violated.
However, as noted by (Wickens, 2002), “any theoretical mod-
el, once its parameters are estimated, implies a comparable
table of predicted frequencies. If the observed frequencies
are similar to the predicted frequencies, then the model fits,
and if they differ, the model fails (p.213).” Therefore, we also
performed chi-square goodness of fit tests, comparing our
observed frequencies to the expected distributions under the
equal-variance model and unequal variance model, and con-
ducted a hierarchical model comparison to see if one model
was significantly better than the other.
Results confirmed the hypothesis that for many sub-
jects both AB and PS trial types were marked by unequal
variances for the signal and noise distributions (see Fig.
11). For PS trials, the slopes on average were below 1
(mean = 0.87, p < .0001), and 17 of the 35 subjects were
better explained by a model that assumed unequal
variances (chi-square value > 3.84 for these subjects).
For AB trials, the average slope of the zROC lines was
above 1 (mean = 1.11, p < .01), and 12 of the 35 subjects
were better explained by a model assuming unequal var-
iances (chi-square value > 3.84 for these subjects).
In a final analysis, using the estimated slopes and inter-
cepts for the AB and PS trials, we computed the average
slope and average intercept across all subjects to determine
if our data supported the hypothesis of unequal variances
for the signal and noise distributions for the two condi-
tions. The amount of simulated confidence criteria was
set to 20 and were evenly placed around the criterion (C)
of the participant that was simulated, half on the right of C
and half on the left. As can be seen in Fig. 12, the estimated
variance for the distributions of both the AB and PS con-
ditions appear to violate the assumption of equal variance,
and using these values (which includes estimates for the
average mean for these distributions across subjects), this
Fig. 8 Simulation of a detection task with equal variances for the signal
and noise distribution, using standard signal detection theoretic tools. (a)
Graphical representation for stimulus encoding and perceptual decisions
in this framework. Shown here are two distributions, representing the
encoding of a sensory signal (blue) and the encoding of noise (black).
On any given trial, either a stimulus or noise is presented, and the observer
compares a sample drawn from one of these two distributions to the
internal criterion (green) to make their perceptual judgment about
stimulus presence/absence. (b) Receiver-operating characteristic (ROC)
curves for trials where subjects responded “yes, stimulus present” (left) or
“no, stimulus absent” (right). The different confidence ratings in this
simulated experiment (20 total) are shown in blue. The closer the point
on the blue curve is to the origin, the higher the given confidence rating
(blue dots). Whenever the curve is above the black diagonal, it indicates
that the metacognitive responses of the observer can distinguish correct
from incorrect trials
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scenario can produce matched ROC curves and AUC
values for “yes” responses (Fig. 12b, left, Fig. 12c, left)
and mismatched ROC curves and AUC responses for “no”
responses (Fig. 12b, right, Fig. 12c, right). Though the
overall magnitude of the effect in our data is smaller than
the demonstration in Fig. 10, this is to be expected: as
shown in Fig. 11, while some subjects violate the assump-
tion of equal variance with slopes that are different from 1,
other subjects’ results are modeled quite effectively with
distributions with equal variance, as slopes are near 1.
Overall, this analysis supports the hypothesis that unequal
variances can drive the observed effects, and is further
verified by its congruence with results from Fig. 5.
Discussion
Previously, it has been shown that metacognitive ability is
higher for responses in a categorization task compared to a
detection task, and that this difference is primarily driven by
performance on trials in which subjects reported that a target
stimulus was not presented on a given trial (Meuwese et al.,
2014). We hypothesized that this previous finding may be
accounted for by violations of the assumption of equal variance
in signal detection theory, and performed simulations and an
experiment to replicate these results and demonstrate possible
theoretical underpinnings of this reported effect. Through our
modeling simulations, we find that, indeed, when the variance
Fig. 9 Theoretical simulation of a detection task with unequal variances
for the signal and noise distributions. (a) Graphic representation of the
type 1 decision space. Shown here is an example where the variability of
encoding of the sensory signal is either lower (blue) or higher (red) than
the precision of encoding the noise signal (black). The distributions differ
in standard deviation (.8 & 1.43 for red and blue, respectively), but have
the same mean (2.44). Perceptual decisions are made by comparing the
sample drawn to an internal criterion (shown in green). (b) Response-
conditional ROC Curves for simulated data for trials where the subject
responded “yes, stimulus present” (hits and false alarms) or “no, stimulus
absent” (misses and correct rejections). As can be seen in this example,
the ROC curves are quite similar for both the low-variance and high-
variance cases for trials where the subject responses “yes, stimulus pres-
ent,” indicating variance of the signal distribution has minimal impact on
this measure. However, the variance of the signal distribution has a much
greater influence on the trials where the subject responded “no, stimulus
absent,” illustrating the importance of testing the assumption of equal
variances when computing AUC values for this measure. (c) Area under
the curve for the “yes” response trials (hits and false alarms) and area
under the curve for the “no” response trials (correct rejections and misses)
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of “signal present” distribution is different from the “signal
absent” distribution, this has aminimal impact on the area under
the ROC curve for trials were participants report that a target
stimulus was presented, but a significant impact on the ROC
curve for trials when participants report that a stimulus was not
presented (Fig. 9). In our experiment, we had subjects perform a
detection task using two conditions shown to produce matched
type 1 performance and different levels of metacognition on
trials with reported stimulus absence (Figs. 4 and 5) and find
that these conditions violate the assumption of equal variance in
signal detection theory, and therefore can at least partially ex-
plain previous results (Figs. 10, 11 and 12).
Kanai et al. (2010) offered one possible explanation of what
may be driving these effects: differences in metacognitive judg-
mentsmay be due to an “awareness availability.”The awareness
in AB or short lag trials might be in an all or none fashion (as
suggested by Sergent & Dehaene, 2004), while the PS or long
lag trials may be more gradual. In other words, whereas
attentional blindness is subjectively an all-or-none phenomenon
(an observer either notices or doesn’t notice the second target,
i.e. it is either present or absent in the awareness), the PS ma-
nipulation causes difficulties in recognition/categorization of a
supraliminal (and thus clearly perceptible) target. We find some
evidence to support these claims: as shown in Fig. 6, “yes”
responses (left column) lead to a stronger confidence profile
during attentional blindness compared to phase scrambling (re-
gardless of whether the yes response is correct), whereas “no”
responses (right column) lead to under-confidence during atten-
tional blindness compared to phase scrambling. As “signal”
trials are degraded in phase scrambling, it seems reasonable that
subjects have more confidence in hits during attentional blind-
ness than during phase scrambling, and interestingly, this effect
carries over to false alarms. Conversely, the performance drop
for “no” responses during attentional blindness is caused by an
inability to access the target, and this makes participants less
confident that their response is correct when they miss a target
or report absence of a trial, compared to phase scrambling. Thus,
at some level subjects seem to “know” when they miss a trial
due to attentional blindness when compared to phase scram-
bling, as a miss is caused at a higher level in the decision-
making hierarchy.
While our results provide evidence for our conclusion, there
were some limitations in this study. For example, as noted by
Maniscalco and Lau (2014), constructing pseudo-type 1 ROC
curves based on confidence judgments risks confounding type
1 and type 2 sensitivity. If separate mechanisms influence type
1 and type 2 judgments, it is possible that asymmetries emerge
at the metacognitive level (due to response-conditional changes
in type 2 sensitivity), which is then mimicked by a type 1
unequal variance model. As shown in the simulations in
Maniscalco and Lau (2014), pseudo-type 1 ROC curves with
slopes that are different from one can be generated by an equal
variance model with differences in response-specific metacog-
nition. Thus, while our results suggest this variance asymmetry,
it is potentially also consistent with an equal-variancemodel but
with response-conditional metacognitive noise.
Fig. 11 Slopes of zROC lines. (a) Phase scrambled (PS) trials. Shown in
this panel are the slopes of the zROC lines for each individual subject. In
general, lines that deviate from a slope of 1 (the black dotted line) indicate
that that the equal variance assumption has been violated. The black dot
on the right-hand side indicates the average slope of the zROC lines, with
SEM across subjects. (b) Attentional blink (AB) trials, with the same
conventions as panel A
Fig. 10 zROC space for one representative subject. Shown in this figure
are the z-scored false alarm rates and hit rates for the attentional blink
(AB) condition for a representative subject, with the linear model fit to
these points
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Moving forward, additional findings to strengthen the un-
equal variance explanation of yes/no asymmetry in metacog-
nition could come in using an independent method to shift the
type 1 criterion (i.e., other than confidence ratings), such as
payoff asymmetries, changes in stimulus base rates, or instruc-
tions in separate sessions. From these data, one could fit the
variance ratio to the type 1 ROCs from this session, and ask
whether it predicts the yes/no type 2 ROC asymmetry in the
confidence rating session. If it does, then this is strong evi-
dence that the metacognitive asymmetry emerges from un-
equal variance at the type 1 level that is manifest whenever
there is a shift in type 1 criterion.
Another important limitation in the study was our inability to
staircase the AB trials to a fixed percentage. Staircasing would
involve changing the stimulus duration in general or contrast of
the AB (second) target. Both would be theoretically difficult.
Changing stimulus duration would also have to be paralleled in
the PS trials, but then it would be difficult to staircase the long lag
trials since the staircased variable (level PS) difficulty would
depend on the (slightly) changing stimulus duration. Changing
the contrast of the second target in AB trials would also be
theoretically difficult, since then theAB trials would include both
perceptual and attentional blindness manipulations (Kanai et al.,
2010), and the rationale was to include one perceptual and one
Fig. 12 Detection task results based on experimental data, using the
estimated slopes, intercepts, and criteria, averaged across all
participants. (a) Graphic representation of the decision space. Shown
here are the estimated variances for the signal distributions for the
phase scrambling (PS; blue) and attentional blink (AB; red) conditions
using the average values from the slopes and intercepts of the zROC lines
for each participant. We also include the average criteria for the AB (dark
green) and PS (light green) conditions. (b) Receiver-operating character-
istic (ROC) curves using the average zROC slope, zROC intercept, and
criterion across subjects for the PS (blue) and AB (red) “yes, stimulus
present” (hits and false alarms) or “no, stimulus absent” (misses and
correct rejections). As can be seen in this example, the ROC curves are
quite similar for both the low-variance and high-variance cases for trials
where the subject responses “yes, stimulus present,” indicating variance
of the signal distribution has minimal impact on this measure. However,
the variance of the signal distribution has a much greater influence on the
trials where the subject responded “no, stimulus absent,” illustrating the
importance of testing the assumption of equal variances when computing
AUC values for this measure. (c) Area under the curve for the “yes”
response trials (hits and false alarms) and area under the curve for the
“no” response trials (correct rejections and misses) for the PS (blue) and
AB (red) conditions
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attentional blindness manipulation. Nevertheless, the analyses
showed that the average percentages were around 70% correct
across both conditions, which is near threshold. We also think
that requiring subjects to make the same type of confidence
judgment for both T1 and T2 trials would be worthwhile, as
the current procedure might have induced the heightened
metacognitive sensitivity to their T2 performance, which could
in turn bias the results.
A final limitation to note is the lack of a fitting control trial
type. We considered including trials in which the second target
would be outside the AB timespan (as with the long lag) and
without phase scrambling. However, such trials would be sub-
stantially less challenging or difficult and could have influenced
how the confidence ratings would be distributed across trials of
the same difficulty. The control trials would be more clearly
visible, and thus also would have received higher confidence
ratings while the experimental trials (AB and PS) would have
gotten the lower confidence ratings. For this reason, we did not
include separate control trials.
Nonetheless, we consider these results informative. As we
demonstrate in our simulations and experimental data, these
findings stress the importance of assessing whether the equal
variance assumption has been violated when analyzing
detection-task data. A suggestion for future research is to com-
bine this paradigm with EEG, to see if there is a difference in
how well a decoder can categorize animal targets from no-
animal targets for both trial types (short lag and long lag)
and if this correlates with the metacognitive judgments.
Finally, we also suggest that researchers compare conditions
using manipulations other than attentional blink and phase
scrambling, to see if these same trends would emerge.
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